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Article 6

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS
Mitchell Wendell*
Each of the states and the federal government maintain separate correctional establishments. They do so for a variety of policy
reasons, historic considerations, and legal necessities arising out of
constitutional doctrine. As a practical matter, there are both advantages and disadvantages to this decentralized approach to corrections. To some extent it is appropriate to examine the merits of
our present system, even in an article devoted to devices available
for bridging jurisdictional lines in the correctional field. But since
the basic character of the division of responsibilities for correctional
administration and policy go far beyond the correctional field itself and would require much larger adjustments in our entire pattern of government than can be considered within the present compass, it becomes immeasurably more important to emphasize at the
very outset that our choice is not between a multitude of state and
federal correctional systems operating in virtually complete isolation from one another and a single system with all inclusive judicial
and administrative jurisdiction.
Considerations of economy and efficiency may have some relevance to studies of optimum size and scope for individual penal
systems. But the main reason for pursuing inquiries along these
lines is that a large number of individuals who have been convicted
of crime and who will sooner or later be returned to the street are
constantly being punished, restrained, rehabilitated, and reformed,
embittered, or worked on without visible effect by more than one
of these systems. Sometimes it is the federal prison system and a
state prison system that have a concurrent or consecutive effect on
the individual; sometimes it is two or more states. In any case,
there are social, clinical, administrative, and economic reasons for
producing as close to a unified program of treatment for each inmate, and for each parolee or probationer, as possible. The history
of interstate programs for this purpose is at least thirty years old.
There are some concrete accomplishments on the record. There are
also a number of possibilities for further action which are suggested
by experience to date, and undoubtedly many more which could result from the application of creative analysis and imagination.
I. BASES OF THE PRESENT MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
SYSTEM
The multiplicity of penal systems in the United States seems to
*
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be a result of the construction of our federalism, rather than of a
decision specifically taken on account of policies directly related to
the administration of law enforcement or rehabilitative programs.
The enumerated powers in the federal constitution nowhere refer
to the establishment and maintenance of a federal penal system.
Indeed, the closest approximation of any such reference is in the
fifth, sixth and seventh amendments which by prescribing certain
requirements for trials in criminal cases in the federal courts assume the existence of a federal criminal law enforcement program,
at least up to and including the verdict and sentence. As is well
known, the police power remained with the states.
It also seems to have been a basic assumption of the federal
system that each independent jurisdiction within it was to have the
power to prescribe penalties for violations of its own laws and to
administer their imposition.1 This inevitably means a penal system in each of the states and in the federal government.
While it does not follow as a matter of inexorable logic that
separate state and local police systems and separate court systems to
try and sentence persons for the commission of crimes necessitates
separate programs and sets of facilities in each jurisdiction to handle the postconviction custody and treatment of offenders, such
separatism does seem to have flowed naturally from the operation
of independent law enforcement systems. It had the internal governmental logic of enabling each state and the federal government
to legislate for and administer a complete system of criminal jurisprudence and correctional programs to implement its own penal
statutes and social policies. It can be argued that this ability of
each government having constitutional status within the federal
system to work out its own means of dealing with offenders against
its laws is an important element of the independence underlying
the basic division of powers on which the American governmental
framework rests. On a less philosophic plane, it can be observed
that just as public school systems, mental health hospitals and programs, and most social welfare facilities and programs are inaugurated and operated on a decentralized basis (at the state, and local
levels of government), so. it is with correctional activities, both of
an institutional and community character. There are benefits
from having these programs and services close to the people they
serve or regulate, especially if it is presumed that the states are to
continue to be effective and significant lawmaking and enforcing
units of government.
All of this is not to gainsay the problems inherent in or created
1 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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by a multiplicity of correctional systems. The optimum size for a
penal program or for particular parts of it is not easy to determine.
If an entity is too small it is likely to lack sufficient resources; if it
is too large, it may become unwieldy and unresponsive to public
and individual needs. If the objects upon which the correctional
systems operate move about but each of the systems remains territorially or otherwise fixed in its jurisdiction, a desirable unity or
coordination of program for the individual offender may never become a reality. Given the configuration of our federal system, the
principal focus of our attention should be on what can be done to
encourage improved, and wherever desirable, coordinated or unified treatment of individual offenders.
II.

COOPERATIVE USE OF INSTITUTIONS

The states are territorial units of government. While there are
some significant circumstances under which their jurisdiction may
be made to extend beyond their borders, the normal rule is that
jurisdiction ends at the state line. Only the authority of the federal government can be exercised directly from one end of the nation to the other, but its criminal jurisdiction too is limited. The
nature of the restriction derives from the backhanded way in which
most of the federal criminal law must be built to satisfy the constitutional division of powers between the national government and
the states. Most federal crimes are not legally described as the
commission of acts constituting murder, arson, rape, larceny, fraud,
etc. Instead the prohibited conduct is using the channels of interstate commerce to flee from prosecution; 2 interfering with the
civil rights of a person;3 destroying federal property; 4 transporting
a woman in the channels of interstate commerce for immoral purposes;5 .transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce; 6
or using the mails to defraud.7 For constitutional reasons (i.e., because the congressional power to legislate must be pegged to a delegated power found in the Constitution), the legal fiction studiously
preserved is that the evil is not the act which most people would
recognize as antisocial, but some auxiliary feature of it such as the
intrinsically harmless or largely irrelevant movement in interstate
commerce. Consequently, the federal prison and conditional release
authorities have responsibilities toward arsonists who have burn18
18
4 18
18
6 18
7 18
2

3

U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §

1073 (1964).
241 (1964).
1361 (1964).
2421 (1964).
2312 (1964).
1341 (1964).
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ed down post offices, but not those who have set the torch to private
homes or factories; sex offenders and procurers whose sin consists
in their being mobile, but not those who are content to do their
business in the neighborhood; "con men" who write letters to advance their swindles, but not those who restrict themselves to faceto-face conversation. Needless to say most of the offenders who
perform these acts have no moral compunctions concerning whether
the property they steal or destroy is federal or private, or whether
they cross political boundaries in the conduct of their crimes.
Nevertheless, these distinctions have a bearing on who turns up in
the federal and state correctional systems. In the case of multiple
or repeated offenders, it makes it virtually inevitable that many of
them will be objects of the correctional efforts of both state and
federal authorities at different times in their lives. In fact, in the
vast majority of cases, the conduct which makes a defendant amen-

able to a federal charge also spells out a state crime, even if the of-

fenses may be described somewhat differently in order to meet the
specific language of the federal or state statute.8 In a somewhat
lesser but still very large number of instances, a defendant in a

state prosecution could, on the same facts, be charged with the
commission of a federal crime.9

Whenever a conscious effort is

made to have the prosecuting agency of one jurisdiction defer to
that of another jurisdiction, it may be done in explicit recognition
of considerations such as the length and type of sentence likely

on the comparable federal and state offenses and so, at least in part,

on the basis of the penal program likely to follow from conviction
of one or the other crime.
III. COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAMS

One way to reduce the disadvantages inherent in a multiplicity
of correctional jurisdictions is to develop multijurisdictional institutions and programs. Even though the federal government and the
states would still remain separate in their lawmaking and enforcement responsibilities, joint use of facilities, personnel and programs
B Even if the specific acts, or course of conduct constituting the federal
- crime is identical with the facts or course of conduct constituting the
state crime, separate prosecutions and convictions for each offense do
-not constitute double jeopardy, See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197
(1893); United States v. Lackey, 99 Fed. 952 (2d Cir. 1900);-People v.
Sichofsky, 58 Cal. App. 257, 208 Pac. 340 (1922).
9 This comes about because state crimes are more generic: e.g., theft
rather than theft of particular objects; homicide rather than homicide
in particular locations.
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would make it less likely that individual offenders would become
involved with more than one set of prison officials, social workers,
psychiatrists, and parole or probation agents taking their separate
routes, albeit at different times, in trying to punish or treat him.
To the extent that federal authorities have generally lodged limited
numbers of prisoners in state and local detention or correctional
facilities, if they had no institutions of their own in the area, such
a reduction may be said to have long standing precedent. But as
a major tool for consolidating significant segments of the correctional apparatus, there is no federal-state cooperative program.
On the interstate level, there are a number of interesting beginnings
of consolidation or of some other type of cooperation aimed in one
way or another at coordinating the correctional program for individual prisoners or at improving some aspect of their treatment.
A natural concomitant of the present approach to the penal
functions is that each state must build and operate prisons and
varying numbers and kinds of auxiliary facilities for its inmate
population. Perhaps the basic reason why these institutions and
the programs they house are usually judged inadequate is that most
people are not very enthusiastic about large expenditures of public
money for correctional activities. They assign higher priorities to
the more "deserving" elements of society, or to governmental activities which bring more tangible benefits to the economic, recreational, educational, or health needs of the community. But to
whatever extent available resources can support correctional institutions and services, sharing of them by groups of states could either
reduce the cost to each of them or improve the facilities and programs purchasable with any given amount of dollars. This statement is probably truest of states with small populations which
cannot expect to have prison populations of optimum size for economic and clinical efficiency. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the first moves toward multistate correctional facilities have
been made either wholly or largely by these smaller states.
About fifteen years ago, a group of western states seemed to be
on the verge of concluding arrangements for the establishment of a
regional women's prison. The fact that female inmates are generally far less numerous than male prisoners meant that in virtually
all of the sparsely populated western jurisdictions the difficulty of
justifying adequate institutions and programs for very small numbers of women convicted in the courts of a single state was acute.
Dovetailing with this need was the happy circumstance that the
California Women's Prison at Tehachapi was about to become vacant through the moving of its inmates to a new facility. Consequently, the states surrounding California and having minimal
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facilities of their own were interested in having their needs met on a
pooled basis. On the other hand, California seemed amenable, if
the states directly benefited were willing to pay equitable shares of
the cost of a cooperative undertaking. With the stage so well set
for a pioneering venture on a fairly large scale, an earthquake destroyed the Tehachapi prison. The disappearance of the facility
brought the project to an abrupt halt, and nothing tangible was to
eventuate until 1958.
In the meantime, the southern states began to have similar
ideas. They had no ready made Tehachapi, but they did have small
single-state women prisoner populations, and many of them had
inadequate facilities. After a series of negotiations and drafting
efforts, a "South Central Corrections Compact" was developed.
While its language was fairly broad, the immediate point was to
find some way of improving the resources of the region available
for the institutional treatment of women prisoners. Tennessee and
Arkansas enacted the compact in 1955, but interest in the idea
waned before anything came of the project. The parallel with the
western episode was observable. The southerners had been nourished in their hopes by what seemed to be an imminent prospect
that one or more of their states were about to build new women's
institutions which, with proper foresight and commitments, could
be used for regional purposes, as well as for the needs of the single
states contemplating the construction. When it became apparent
that financial and other obstacles were delaying the building programs and that the facilities in question might not materialize, the
urgency seemed to go out of further consideration of the compact.
In the West the idea of regional cooperation relating to use of
correctional institutions was revived in the late 1950's. While speculation about the possibility of securing at least one facility already
in existence that could be turned over for regional use was again in
the picture, neither the scope of the Western Corrections Compact
as it took shape nor its immediate legislative success depended on
the occurrence of such an event. Within a short time the eleven
states and the Territory of Guam now party to the compact had
joined. 0 Once again, however, the potentialities of multistate use
of correctional institutions seem so far to have been realized only
in minimal degree. Contracts for the transfer of a few prisoners
on an individual basis have been negotiated, but there seems to be
nothing like the varied and significant reliance upon the compact to
provide the facilities and services needed to meet a major part of
10 The states party to this compact are Alaska, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming and the Territory of Guam.
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any state's correctional obligations.
Only several years after the Western Interstate Corrections
Compact became a legal reality, if not a continuously used instrument, the six New England states took up the idea. Their compact,
now in force among all six of them," is a virtual word for word
copy of the Western agreement. But in this instance, actual use of
the compact to incarcerate prisoners in party states other than the
one in which conviction was had is noticeable and growing. 12 Also,
the New Englanders appear to be more flexible and inventive in
their conception of the types of cooperative use of institutions
which may be beneficial.
Of course, the possibility of one or more institutions actually
constructed and operated on a regional basis is in the New England
thoughts too. In fact the sparsely populated Northern New England
States are actively studying the matter. However, the concept of
existing prisons in each of the party states as regional resources
seems to be taking hold in a way not observable elsewhere. An
article by a state official who had much to do with the negotiation
and early administration of the New England Corrections Compact
is very revealing in this respect. 3 Commissioner McGrath begins
with an account of a Maine prisoner who was being kept in solitary
confinement at his own request in order to protect him from possible reprisals. Among its unfortunate effects, this isolation made
it impossible to make this prisoner part of any of the normal rehabilitative and other programs of the institution. Accordingly, he
was transferred to a prison in another party state, where it was
possible to treat him as an inmate in the regular program of the
institution. Some other elements of the New England concept are
most easily and succinctly conveyed in Commissioner McGrath's
own words:
Prison administrators also can use the compact when necessary to
break up hostile groups of inmates or to provide for emergencies,
such as sudden overcrowding, or the destruction of cell blocks by
fire or other causes.' 4
Both the New England and Western Interstate Corrections Compacts are enabling devices. They authorize the cooperative construction and use of correctional institutions by the party states on
a regional basis. The institutions concerned can be specially con"

12
13

The text of the compact is embodied in the statutes of each of the
party states.
See McGrath, The New England Interstate Corrections Compact, 38
STATE GOV'T 16 (1965).
Ibid.

14 Id. at 18.
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structed for operation under the compacts, or they can be facilities

already in existence and used in greater or lesser part as single
state institutions, with space made available to prisoners placed
there pursuant to the interstate agreement. The compacts also set
forth the procedures for safeguarding the civil rights of inmates,
transferring them between or among the party states, and expressly
describe the basic rights of party states in respect to facilities being
used as compact institutions and prisoners lodged therein. However, neither compact makes actual provision for the cooperative incarceration of any prisoners. This must be done pursuant to contracts for the purpose. The compact provides authority for the
making of these contracts by the appropriate officials of each party
state.
There are three basic legal questions which must be answered
satisfactorily if any program contemplating multistate use of penal
institutions is to succeed: (1) Can the necessary administrative
and judicial jurisdiction over prisoners be maintained when they
are moved beyond the territorial limits of the state of conviction?;
(2) Can procedures be developed to meet due process and equal
protection requirements relating to the civil rights of prisoners?;
and (3) Can legally and administratively feasible arrangements be
made for the financing and operation of institutions on a shared
basis? 15 While a thorough exploration of all significant facets of
these questions would take more than a single article, it can be
said that each of these matters was carefully considered in the development of the Western and New England Compacts. The principal elements of the solutions can be summarized in relatively
brief compass.
When the correctional facility is in the same state where the
court which convicted and sentenced the offender, there is no doubt
that jurisdiction to incarcerate exists. Whether custody of the prisoner is technically retained by the court or whether it is turned
over to an administrative agency (e.g., the state department of corrections), depends on the statutory scheme established by the legislative enactments of the different states. In any case, however,
state process may be presumed sufficient within its own borders.
On the other hand, we are not accustomed to think of State X having any power to act within State Y, certainly not if an exercise of
15

The first two of these questions are discussed in detail (with the inclusion of appropriate citations) in a legal brief prepared for The Outof-State Incarceration Amendment to the Interstate Compact for the
Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, COUNCIL OF STATS GovERNMENTS, INTERSTATE CRUME CONTROL 84-89 (rev. ed. 1955). The text of
the amendment and other materials related to it appear in Chapter V
of the Handbook.
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regulatory authority is involved.
Fortunately for the success of the type of interjurisdictional
cooperation under discussion, it was long ago determined that states
could achieve some extraterritorial effects by adopting interstate
compacts.' 6 Indeed some of these instruments have even conferred
outright criminal jurisdiction on one party state in lands or waters
7
of other party states.'
The much litigated Interstate Compact for the Supervision of
Parolees and Probationers (discussed later in this article) has firmly
established that jurisdiction sufficient to support the supervision of
persons on conditional release from incarceration may be maintained on an interstate basis.' 8 Since parole and probation rest on
the same legal foundation as incarceration and are simply the result
of judicial or administrative decisions to restrain persons outside
prison walls rather than within them,19 it follows that a state
which may validly cause the supervision of a person convicted of
crime to take place in another state may also cause his incarceration there. In each case the determinative question is whether the
restraint is accomplished pursuant to sufficient authorizing law and
under procedures which safeguard constitutional guarantees.
Since the compacts are statutes of the party states 20 and specifically authorize incarceration in any other party state, they meet
the first of these requirements. The matter of prisoners' rights
16 ZnwmimuANN & WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
17

41-42, 77-78 (1961).
Ibid.

18

For a collection of the authorities see

19

cit. supra note 15, ch. IV.
Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943); Jenkins v. Madigan, 211

INTERSTATE

CRvIM CONTROL, Op.

F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 842 (1954); Dillingham

v. United States, 76 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1935); United States v. Gerson,
192 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Tenn. 1961), affd, 302 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1962);

United States v. Koppelman, 53 F. Supp. 499 (M.D. Pa. 1943); United
States ex rel. Gutterson v. Thompson, 47 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. N.Y. 1942),
affd, 135 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Eddinger, 236 Mich. 668, 211
20

N.W. 54 (1926); Crooks v. Sanders, 123 S.C. 28, 115 S.E. 760 (1922).
Almost without exception interstate compacts are enacted by the legislatures of the states pursuant to the same procedures as the enactment of ordinary statutes. Once enacted they are statutory law and
have a force even superior to that of ordinary statutes. See State ex
rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 1 (1823); State v. Hoofman, 9 Md. 28 (1856); President, Managers & Co. v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 13 N.J. Eq. 46 (Ch. 1860); State
v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 Atl. 269 (1903). Cf. Coffee v. Groover,
123 U.S. 1 (1887). See also Union Fisherman's Co-op. Packing Co. v.
Shoemaker, 98 Ore. 659, 193 Pac. 476 (1920).
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requires somewhat more explanation because it involves several
related but separate problems. A clear understanding of the problem and its solution can be gained best by asking what a prisoner
must receive and then by seeing whether there is any reason why
it cannot be afforded in another state as well as in the state of
conviction.
It seems quite clear that no prisoner is entitled to be incarcerated in any particular geographic location, and certainly not in a
place close to the locale of the crime or of the convicting court. If
any such proximity was a constitutional necessity, the federal
prison system could not function on anything like its present basis.
Since the relevant protections of the Bill of Rights are at least as
demanding as anything required of the states by the fourteenth
amendment, 21 it would seem that incarceration within the geographic confines of any given state is no more essential to the personal rights of an inmate in a state prison than in a federal prison.
A prisoner is entitled to treatment which satisfies the standards of humanity imposed by due process and the avoidance of
cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, the prisoner must have
access to the courts to test the legality of his detention and must be
afforded whatever statutory rights, such as hearings, as the laws of
the state of conviction may confer upon prisoners in similar circumstances. The compacts provide for all of these matters. The
several excerpts from the identical language of the Western and
22
New England agreements illustrates the specifics of the approach.
The problems of cost sharing must be looked at in two ways,
depending on the method chosen for establishing and operating the
institutions. If the facilities are either existing or projected correctional institutions, built, staffed and operated by a single state,
either wholly or partly for prisoners under a compact, the question
of financing necessary to the undertaking can be answered in exactly the same way as it would be if the state were building its own
institution, with no thought of serving any but its own prisoners.
The normal appropriative or borrowing processes of the state are
the ones to be followed. The ownership of the facilities is not in
question. The incarceration of prisoners for other party states is
handled pursuant to contracts for services among the "sending" and
21

22

The widely employed rule stemming from Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), is that many but not all of the protections of the first
eight amendments to the United States Constitution are applicable to
the states by reason of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment.
See Article IV of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact reproduced in the appendix.
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"receiving" states. The payments made by the sending state can
be arranged on any reasonable basis set forth in the contract and
can cover benefits actually provided. As explained in the brief historical account of the development of the two compacts, all of the
actual experience to date is with prisoners handled in this way by
institutions primarily used for inmates of the state in which the
facility is located.
On the other hand, it may be that some states will want to build
new facilities entirely or largely for regional purposes. If two or
more states are to contribute significantly to the capital construction costs of new institutions, questions of ownership rights and
status could arise. Both compacts seek to avoid problems of this
sort by treating such capital construction as purchases of contract
rights. Since the compact language setting forth the envisaged
method is not long, the easiest way to explain it is by quotation.23
It will be noted that both the use of existing single-state institutions for compact purposes and construction of new facilities
with some degree of availability for compact use are so arranged as
to result in an operational facility and program basically administered by a single entity. This was done for purposes of simplicity,
which seemed especially compelling because of the pioneering nature of the concepts. At least in theory, there is no reason why
such regional correctional facilities could not be truly joint-owned
and administered by interstate agencies established by compact.
The most desirable approach is dictated by policy considerations. 24
IV. PAROLE AND PROBATION
The oldest and by far the largest interstate correctional pro23

24

"Prior to the construction or completion of construction of any institution or addition thereto by a party state, any other party state or
states may contract therewith for the enlargement of the planned
capacity of the institution or addition thereto, or for the inclusion
therein of particular equipment or structures, and for the reservation
of a specific per centum of the capacity of the institution to be kept
available for use by inmates of the sending state or states so contracting. Any sending state so contracting may, to the extent that monies
are legally available therefor, pay to the receiving state, a reasonable
sum as consideration for such enlargement of capacity, or provision of
equipment or structures, and reservation of capacity. Such payment
may be in a lump sum or in installments as provided in the contract."
Western Interstate Corrections Compact, Article III(b).
When legislation to enact the New England Interstate Corrections Compact was before the Massachusetts Legislature it was submitted to the
Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. The opinion was
favorable to the legislation and Massachusetts joinder. Opinion of the

Justices, 344 Mass. 770, 184 N.E.2d 353 (1962).

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS
gram is in parole and probation.

531

Pursuant to the Interstate Com-

25
pact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, it is possible for persons convicted in one state to be supervised on parole or
probation in another jurisdiction. All fifty states, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands are parties to the compact. Only the District of

Columbia for which Congress acts as the legislature and which

would have to function as the enacting authority, does not participate.
The compact received its first adoptions in 1936, immediately
after having been drafted. By 1951 all of the states were parties to
it. During recent years, between ten and fifteen thousand persons
have regularly received correctional services pursuant to the com28
pact.
The compact itself is a relatively brief and simple document.
Its essential provisions can be summarized as follows:
1. A parolee or probationer may be placed under supervision
in a party jurisdiction other than the one where conviction occurred
if he is a resident of the state where supervision is to be had (receiving state), if employment opportunities are suitable there, or if
there is some other connection with the receiving state which makes
it appear that rehabilitative opportunities will be improved by
sending the parolee or probationer to the receiving state.
2. The authority for keeping the parolee or probationer on
conditional release derives from the state of conviction (sending
state), but the standards of supervision employed are those of the
receiving state.
3. A supervisee under the compact may be retaken by the
sending state at any time and only the courts of the sending state
may adjudicate questions relating to the parole or probation or
the retaking.
Partly because any law for the incarceration or partial restraint of individuals is likely to be contested by those who are restrained, and partly because the parole and probation compact was
a pioneering effort to achieve an interjurisdictional correctional
program of major proportions, there have been more court tests of
this compact than of any other. It has survived them all, with not
,25 The text of the compact is contained in the statutes of each of the fifty
states. It is also to be found in INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra note
15, together with considerable explanatory material.
26 The Council of State Governments collects statistics on an annual basis
showing the case load under the compact. This information is available in mimeograph form.
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a single successful attack on its validity.27 While the very idea that
a person could be effectively restrained of his liberty on a continuing basis pursuant to the penal power of another jurisdiction was
unfamiliar to traditional concepts of American criminal jurisprudence, constitutional questions were eased, if not entirely dissipated, by certain discretionary and consensual features of proceedings under the compact. In the first place, no person has a constitutional right to be placed on parole or probation. Such status is
dependent on the existence of statutes creating the form and substance of conditional release, as well as the procedures for obtaining
and keeping it. Moreover, every parole and probation system in
the United States provides that conditional release is afforded at
the discretion of the paroling authority or court when it finds that
in its judgment the prisoner is likely to make a proper adjustment
outside of prison walls. 28 Since parole or probation can continue
only until the expiration of the maximum term of a validly imposed sentence, any challenge which a parolee or probationer may
wish to make to his disposition must contend with the proposition
that he could legally have been compelled to remain in the higher
degree of restraint inherent in incarceration.
Of at least equal importance to the avoidance of constitutional
issues under this particular compact has been the voluntary character of the interstate aspect. No candidate for parole or probation
is forced to accept supervision in another state. If granted parole
or probation, the necessary circumstance leading to supervision in
another jurisdiction under the compact is his agreement to go there.
In fact, as a practical matter, the process is initiated by the desire of
an inmate applying for parole or a convicted defendant being considered for probation to go home or to go to a place where, for whatever reason, he believes that things will be better for him than if
he remains in the sending state. The official forms promulgated
by the Parole and Probation Compact Administrators Association
27

Supra note 18.

28

Parole and probation are matters of grace and not of right.

See

Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Smith v. United

States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1964);
Yates v. United States, 308 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1962); Bryson v. United
States, 265 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959);

Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Steiner, 239 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1957); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d
42 (5th Cir. 1949); Raynor v. American Broadcasting Co., 222 F. Supp.
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reflect and reinforce this situation, from the evidenciary point of
view. One of these forms recites that:
, in consideration of being granted (parole)
I,
and especially being granted the
(probation) by the
hereby
to go to
privilege to leave the state of
agree: .... 2. That I will comply with the conditions of (parole)
and
(probation) as fixed by both the states of
(sending state)
(receiving state)

;

3. That I will, when duly instructed by
;

the
return at any time to the state of
4. That I hereby waive extradition to the state of
(sending state)

from any jurisdiction in or outside the United States where I may
be found and also agree that I will not contest any effort by any
5.
s;
jurisdiction to return me to the state of
(sending state)
Failure to comply with the above will be deemed to be a violation
of the terms and conditions of (parole) (probation) for which I
may be returned to the state of
(sending state)

Until and unless an interstate correctional agency is created to
administer one or more correctional programs which would then
constitute the only means of dealing with convicts of a given class,
the question always lurking in the background is equal protection.
As the long line of cases dealing with segregated public education
demonstrate, the only way of being absolutely certain that literal
equality of opportunity, services or treatment exists is to give
people identical programs in the very same facility, operated by the
very same personnel. It is an obvious fact that supervision in
State X rather than in State Y is bound to be supervision in a different place, by different parole or probation officers and, at least
to this extent, under different conditions than would pertain in
State Y. It is in this connection that the compact's provision to the
effect that the standards of supervision shall be those of the receiving state merits special explanation.
The only thing that makes the Parole and Probation Compact
feasible is that each party state maintains its own system for the
supervision of persons on conditional release. Most of the subjects
of these systems are intrastate parolees and probationers, and it is
the need to deal with these convicts which provides the primary
justification for the existence of the particular programs. Since
they already exist, it is reasonable to extend their operations to
cover parolees and probationers who come from other jurisdictions.
But it would present an insurmountable administrative problem if
personnel operating or employed by these programs were required
to adapt their routines in individual cases to the idiosyncrasies of
similar programs functioning in the jurisdictions and under the
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statutes and regulations of each state from which a supervisee
comes under the compact.
Fortunately, it has never been seriously suggested that everybody, even within a single state, has an immutable right to get his
education in the same building, from the same teacher, at the same
time of day; and even less that an object of a correctional program
must be in the same prison or have the services of the same parole
officer as each other subject of the system.
In equating the reasonable requirements of equal protection
with the realities and legal necessities of interstate parole and probation, there are several essential tests which the compact and
operations under it must meet. The substantive and procedural
elements of the parole or probation program being used for interstate supervisees must afford the basic constitutional guarantees of
which due process is the most pervasive. The working of the compact presents no special problem on this score. Of course, it is true
that any conditional release program can be lacking in due process,
but if so, it is also defective as applied to the intrastate parolee or
probationer which it serves, and any remedy necessary will be the
same for both intrastate and interstate supervisees. Then too, the
authority by which the parolee or probationer is kept subject to the
program must be one with legally supportable jurisdiction over him.
This requirement is met under the compact because, no matter
where the supervision takes place, the parole or probation is always
from the incarcerating power of the sending state. The supervisee
remains legally a parolee or probationer of the sending state and is
retaken, discharged, or continued on a status of conditional release
only by decisions ultimately made by the appropriate authorities of
the sending state.
Because interstate parole and probation are administered by the
same people, acting pursuant to essentially the same statutes as
apply to intrastate parole and probation, it is inevitable that rehabilitation under the compact has the same merits and deficiencies
attributable to this aspect of our correctional system generally.
However, the compact can be credited with two very important
accomplishments. First, it has introduced a highly desirable element of flexibility into state parole and probation programs by
permitting them to escape the narrow territorial confines of single
state boundaries. One of the great advantages enjoyed by the federal correctional system is that its authority extends throughout
the entire country. This makes it possible to administer supervision
wherever the needs of an individual convict can be served best.
The compact makes it possible for the state systems to afford similar service. Secondly, the compact does have some intangible but
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real effects on the general level of individual state parole and probation systems. While it was earlier explained that the standards
of supervision employed under the compacts are those of the receiving state and that in all probability no other arrangement is feasible,;
the transfer of parolees and probationers from one state to another
inevitably has increased contacts among the relevant officials of all
the states. Such contacts have forced comparisons of the quality
and extent of the programs available in the several jurisdictions.
It is the repeatedly voiced opinion of knowledgeable persons in the
states that such compelled comparisons have acted as a leaven in
securing improvements in the poorer systems, so that the authorities responsible for them might no longer be embarrassed by continuing failure to match the programs of their associates.
V. DETAINERS
Detainers are used by a variety of law enforcement and corrections officials to promote the securing by them of persons already in
custody. They are really notices, usually addressed to prison administrators, that a named prisoner is wanted and that warning of
release should be given so that the sender may be present to pick
the prisoner up. A detainer may be lodged by a police department,
a prosecuting officer, a court, or a correctional official. Its basis
can be anything from an allegation of intention to undertake preliminary steps toward arraignment of the subject to the contention that the prisoner is wanted for return to a penal institution
from which he has escaped. Prison authorities generally honor
detainers, because they consider themselves under a legal and moral
obligation not to shelter persons from other law enforcement officials (either of their own or other jurisdictions) who assert interest in an inmate who may have committed offenses in addition to
the one for which he is presently incarcerated.
Aside from the assistance which detainers afford in securing
persons for trial and punishment on account of crime, their chief
significance lies in their effect on the correctional program already
in progress. To the extent that incarceration is intended to provide
a setting and opportunity for rehabilitative services to make the
inmate ready for return to normal society, both the rehabilitators
and the object of their attention should have considerable certainty
concerning the course of treatment, its duration, and the circumstances under which it will be brought to a successful end. So long
as the sentence being served represents the only bar to outright
release of the prisoner, the limits within which the correctional
program is functioning and its terminal possibilities are known.
But as soon as a detainer is lodged against an inmate, the future
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becomes uncertain, and the resources for present treatment are
diminished.
The first uncertainty arises from the fact that it cannot be
known what will happen to the prisoner at the time of release.
The source of the detainer may or may not be serious about claiming the prisoner; or having once been serious, the officials concerned may lose interest; or the passage of time may have dissipated
the chances of making a case on the charge which originally formed
the basis of the detainer. It has been the experience of many jurisdictions that over half of all detainers yield no pick up when the
date of release actually arrives. If the prisoner is claimed, he may
be released by the claiming authorities in fairly short order; he may
be acquitted of the outstanding charge, or he may ultimately have
a new sentence to serve. Consequently, neither the correctional
authorities nor the inmate has any clear idea whether the present
course of treatment has any realizable goal or when it can be
achieved.
In addition, the curtailment of rehabilitative opportunities can
be severe. The lodging of a detainer against an inmate means that
the prison authorities must become especially solicitous of his security. Special pains frequently are taken to make sure that the
prisoner will be available for delivery at the end of the present
sentence. Parole may be denied, because the degree of freedom
which it imports is inconsistent with security. Or many types of
work rehabilitation and training, requiring lessened security or
temporary presence outside the prison walls, may be foreclosed.
The restrictive effects of the detainer system within a single
state flow from and can be approached by law and practice within
that state. If statutory changes are deemed advisable, they can be
made in the normal manner. If changes in administrative practice
are called for, they lie within the power of single agencies. But
when detainers come from another jurisdiction, cooperative action
is necessary to find the best way of preserving or disposing of them
in accordance with the equities.
The Agreement on Detainers is an interstate compact designed
to eliminate or minimize these problems when they occur on an
interjurisdictional basis. At the present writing, fifteen states
have enacted it. 29 The Agreement covers only detainers lodged
against a prisoner from another party jurisdiction on the basis of
"untried indictments, informations or complaints." Consequently,
29

California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania and South Carolina.
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it is aimed at producing a greater degree of certainty with respect
to the possibility of new sentences which may have to be served by
an inmate. By encouraging early trials-usually postponed until
release from the present sentence makes the prisoner available for
prosecution in the other jurisdiction-the Agreement also reduces
the number of instances in which legitimate prosecutions must
be dropped because the passage of time has dissipated necessary
evidence.
The basic feature of the Agreement on Detainers is that it
provides an expeditious means of making a prisoner already serving
a sentence available for trial in another jurisdiction. The availability is only for the purpose of disposing of the untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged. For every purpose other than that of the prosecution and
attendant detention in the other jurisdiction, the state where the
prisoner was incarcerated retains jurisdiction over him. Upon
completion of the proceeding, the prisoner is returned. But at this
stage it is known whether the inmate has been cleared of the charge
on which the detainer was based or whether a new sentence awaits
the prisoner upon his release from the present incarceration.
Either a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged or
the prosecutor in the jurisdiction lodging it may precipitate the
production of the prisoner for trial. If the former invokes the remedy afforded by the Agreement, the defendant must be brought
to trial within 180 days; if the latter demands that the prisoner be
made available, the defendant must be brought to trial within 120
days. The shorter time in the case of a proceeding precipitated
by the prosecutor is appropriate because the prosecutor can time his
demand in accordance with his own case load and the proximity of
an appropriate session of court. It may be observed, however, that
both of these time limits are such as to make the Agreement on
Detainers of little significance for short term prisoners. Such a failure of effective coverage for this group of inmates would seem
inevitable in any system simply because any remedy takes some
time to apply. On the other hand, the short term prisoner presents
a situation of lesser need, because uncertainties with respect to his
future will be resolved relatively soon in any case. Finally, it
should be noted that failure of a prosecutor to bring the prisoner to
trial within the prescribed time limits results in the dismissal of the
charge with prejudice, and consequently in the voiding of the detainer.
One should expect a considerable body of litigation to develop
under the Agreement on Detainers. It involves in a very sensitive
way the presence or absence of personal freedom for prisoners, and
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the course which their treatment may take. However, to date there
has been no litigation questioning the Agreement's validity, even
though some states have been operating under the Agreement for
almost ten years.
It was noted earlier in this article that the federal government
has never been contemplated as a possible party to the Interstate
Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. On the
other hand, the Agreement on Detainers expressly makes the federal government an eligible party. While the nationwide jurisdiction of the United States makes it possible for its own parole and
probation agents to supervise persons anywhere in this country,
the mere fact of geographic inclusiveness does not solve the detainer
problem for the federal government. Federal and state jurisdiction
are separate, both legally and administratively, even when the correctional institutions and courts of each may be in the same state.
Consequently, a federal prisoner with a state detainer or a state
prisoner with a federal detainer against him labors under the same
disabilities as a state prisoner with a detainer against him from
another state. However, Congress has not yet taken any action to
make the federal government a party to the Agreement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has discussed only the major interstate correctional
programs now in operation. Each of them could have been examined in greater detail, but only by exceeding the reasonable bounds
of periodical literature. In addition, there are a number of other
correctional problems of an interjurisdictional nature that may become the subjects of interstate cooperation. For example, the Midwestern Governors' Conference has recently developed the draft of
a Mentally Disordered Offenders Compact which, among other
things, would make possible the cooperative use by two or more
states of institutions for this group of persons. The problem of the
habitual offender also has its interjurisdictional aspects, because
the records of many such individuals show convictions from two or
more states, or from states and the United States. Moreover, if one
turns from the prisoner himself to the personnel needed to treat
him, it is almost universally observed that resources are far from
30 The reports of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on
Interstate Cooperation for the several years when the Agreement on
Detainers was being developed and placed in initial operation provide
much background information. In particular see the report for 1956,
pp. 106-07; report for 1957, pp. 151-57; report for 1958, pp. 144-45;
report for 1959, pp. 183-84; report for 1960, pp. 145-46; report for 1961,
pp. 137-39.
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adequate, either in quality or quantity. Perhaps much more will
be done in the future to educate and train such personnel on a
cooperative basis. Thoughtful people with knowledge of corrections undoubtedly could extend this list of possible multijurisdictional undertakings at great length.
There is no single mould for interjurisdictional cooperation in
the corrections field. Even informal contacts among judges, prison
administrators, parole and probation officials, and many others can
do much-witness the activities of the many regional and national
organizations of professional persons concerned with the several
aspects of penology. But it also should be remarked that the examples of interstate correctional programs reviewed in this article
have been concerned exclusively with programs undertaken via
interstate compact. One may properly conclude from this fact that
the compact is especially well suited to undertakings of this type.
In this connection, two attributes of the compact as a legal form
stand out. It is the only reliable means the states have of extending
and fusing their individual jurisdictions so as to conduct regulatory
programs across state lines. Secondly, the compact is both statutory and contractual in nature. Accordingly, the parties to it and
the beneficiaries of its programs can count on certainty and stability in the definition of their rights and obligations.
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APPENDIX
Western Interstate Corrections Compact
Article IV
PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS
(a) Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative
authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered
into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the
territory of another party state is necessary in order to provide
adequate quarters and care or desirable in order to provide an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may
direct that the confinement be within an institution within the
territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that
regard solely as agent for the sending state.
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in
which it has a contractual right to confine inmates for the purpose
of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting such of its inmates as
may be confined in the institution.
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms
of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of
the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for
transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state, for
transfer to another institution in which the sending state may have
a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose permitted
by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state
shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into under the
terms of Article III.
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each
sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions
pursuant to this compact including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have the benefit of his or
her record in determining and altering the disposition of said inmate
in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state
and in order that the same may be a source of information for the
sending state.
(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable
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and humane manner and shall be cared for and treated equally
with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined
in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving
state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights
which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate
institution of the sending state.
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending
state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending
state, or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state.
The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending
state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of
the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record together
with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the hearing
would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state.
In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this
subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as
agents of the sending state and no final determination shall be
made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state. Costs of records made pursuant to this subdivision shall
be borne by the sending state.
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be
released within the territory of the sending state unless the inmate,
and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon release in
some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost of such
return to its territory.
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any
benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such
obligations modified or his status changed on account of any action
or proceeding in which he could have participated if confined in any
appropriate institution of the sending state located within such
state.
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons
entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or
otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived
of or restricted in his exercise of any power in respect of any inmate
confined pursuant to the terms of this compact.

